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CHARLES BEARD & PROGRESSIVE  
LEGAL HISTORIOGRAPHY 
G. Edward White* 
Last year marked the 100th anniversary of the publication of 
Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. 
When Beard’s work first appeared it was generally well received 
in academic circles, but precipitated an outpouring of protests 
from members of the general public, including former President 
William Howard Taft and the then newspaper publisher Warren 
G. Harding.1 In the next several decades, however, Beard’s claim 
that those who framed the Constitution were “immediately, 
directly, and personally interested in” the outcome of their labors 
at Philadelphia, and were to a greater or lesser extent economic 
beneficiaries from the adoption of the Constitution,2 was regarded 
in historical circles as the best explanation of the framers’ 
motivation. But by 1968 Richard Hofstadter had concluded that 
“Beard’s reputation stands like an imposing ruin in the landscape 
of American historiography.”3 In the end, Hofstadter believed, 
Beard “geared his reputation as a historian so closely to his 
political interests and passions that the two were bound to share 
the same fate.”4 
Hofstadter characterized Beard, along with Frederick 
Jackson Turner and Vernon Parrington, as scholars who 
“explained the American liberal mind to itself in historical terms,” 
who “gave us the pivotal ideas of the first half of the twentieth 
century,” and who “seemed to be able to make American history 
 * David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia. 
 1. Taft suggested to a friend that Beard would have been more satisfied if the 
Constitution had been drafted by “dead beats, out-at-the-elbows demagogues, and cranks 
who never had any money.” RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 
212 (1968). Harding’s paper, the Marion, Ohio Star, characterized An Economic 
Interpretation as “libelous, vicious, and damnable in its influence.” Id. 
 2. Id. at 216 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 324 (1913)). 
 3. Id. at 344. 
 4. Id. at 345. 
349 
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relevant to the political and intellectual issues of the moment.”5 
They were “Progressive” historians. 
In this essay I want to explore the characterization of Beard 
as a “Progressive” historian, because I believe that most 
influential scholarship in legal and constitutional history from the 
time Beard’s Economic Interpretation appeared through the 
1960s, and beyond, shared Beard’s “Progressive” perspective. I 
begin the essay by describing what Hofstadter found deficient in 
Beard’s approach, and how those criticisms reflected the 
dominant perspective of framing-era historians by the late 1960s. 
I then turn back to “Progressive” legal and constitutional 
historiography itself, outlining its central features and starting 
premises, which were far closer to those of Beard than to those of 
his historian critics in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Next I discuss 
another line of criticism of Beard, one that surfaced on the initial 
publication of his Economic Interpretation, and chart the response 
to that criticism by scholars who adopted a “Progressive” 
approach. Finally, I seek to explain why a “Progressive” 
perspective on American legal and constitutional history, despite 
its obvious deficiencies, retained its scholarly influence for so 
long. 
***** 
Hofstadter had initially been influenced by Beard, finding An 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution a book “of profound 
and decisive importance” “[f]or those of us who came of age in 
the 1920’s or 1930’s.”6 But by the 1960s Hofstadter had become 
disaffected with Beard’s approach. The problem, for Hofstadter, 
lay in Beard’s insistence that “[t]here is a dynamic relation 
between interests and ideas, in which the workings of interests can 
never be left out of account.”7 Although Hofstadter 
acknowledged that as a “general proposition . . . ideas and 
 5. Id. at xii. 
 6. Id. at 345. Hofstadter was born in 1916 and read Beard’s popular history, The 
Rise of American Civilization (1927), as an undergraduate at the University of Buffalo, 
from which he graduated in 1936. He then entered a Ph.D. program in history at Columbia, 
receiving his doctorate in 1942, where he read An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution. Hofstadter was active in left-wing politics in the 1930s, joining the 
Communist Party in 1938 and resigning a year later. For more detail see DAVID S. BROWN, 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY (2006). 
 7. Id. at 243.  
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interests [were] somehow associated,”8 he concluded that treating 
ideas as inseparable from interests led to several difficulties. 
One was that “ideas . . . will somehow be dissolved and that 
we will be left only with interests on our hands.”9 Hofstadter 
harbored a “suspicion that Beard . . . [was] looking for a way to 
explain ideas on the assumption that when they were satisfactorily 
explained they would be properly subordinated.”10 
Another difficulty was that “interests will be too narrowly 
construed,” resulting in “too much emphasis [upon] the motives 
and purposes of individuals and groups, not enough on the . . . 
limitations imposed on men by particular historical situations.”11 
Beard did “not seem to have recognized,” Hofstadter maintained, 
“that the way in which men perceive and define their interests is 
in some good part a reflex of the ideas they have inherited and the 
experiences they have undergone.”12 Ideas, for Hofstadter, were 
invariably “repositories of past interests [that] . . . present . . . 
claims of their own that have to be satisfied.”13 Beard’s treatment 
of “ideas, . . . moral impulses, [and] cultural forces that could not 
be closely tied to economic origins” was, Hofstadter concluded, 
“often quite inept.”14 
In sum, Beard’s “ideas-interests formula” led him “to leave 
out . . . the whole area of experience in which ideas and interests 
are jumbled to a degree that the effort to divorce and counterpose 
them becomes an artificial imposition [on] the realities of 
history.”15 In Hofstadter’s view “the central, formative, shattering, 
and then reintegrating experience of civic life” for the “generation 
of the Founding Fathers” was “the Revolution,” “which . . . 
galvanized their inherited store of ideas.”16 Beard’s account of the 
Constitution missed “the moving force of the Revolutionary 
commitment.”17 For Hofstadter, Beard's choice to emphasize the 
“sweep of economic forces” not only made him "far less 
interesting as a historian of ideas," 18 it caused him to characterize 
 8. Id. at 244. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 244–45. 
 14. Id. at 245. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  
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the relationship between the American Revolution and the 
framing of the Constitution in too simplistic a fashion. 
The passages previously quoted from Hofstadter’s critique of 
Beard reveal that his primary concern with Beard’s methodology 
was what it left out. By insisting that there was an indissoluble 
connection between interests and ideas, Beard’s approach invited 
the conclusion that interests, in the end, drove ideas, so that ideas 
eventually disappeared as a force of causal weight in history. As 
applied to the generation that framed the Constitution, this 
conclusion appeared counterintuitive. The central theme of the 
framers’ historical experience, Hofstadter believed, was the 
Revolution, by which he meant not just the war for American 
independence but the whole complex of ideas and events that 
inclined British colonists in America, over the last half of the 
eighteenth century, to consider separating themselves from the 
British Empire and establishing a new nation with a republican 
form of government. 
Hofstadter found it hard to credit that the “Revolutionary 
experience” would not have shaped the framing of the 
Constitution, which was drafted only 11 years after the 
Declaration of Independence. But Beard’s approach, by insisting 
that the Constitution was created by persons who perceived their 
economic interests as being threatened by egalitarian and 
redistributive impulses associated with the Revolution, “[lost] 
touch with the moving force of the Revolutionary commitment.”19 
Beard “seems to have thought of men,” Hofstadter suggested,  
as simply perceiving their interests and then, rather naturally, 
drifting into the acceptance or the use of ideas that would 
further them. He does not seem to have recognized . . . that the 
way in which men perceive and define their interests is in some 
good part a reflex of the ideas they have inherited. . . .20 
By the time Hofstadter’s critique of Beard appeared, a line 
of scholarship emphasizing the singular importance of republican 
ideas to the framing generation was beginning to gain 
prominence. Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the 
American Revolution was published in 1967; Bailyn’s The Origins 
of American Politics in 1968; and Gordon Wood’s The Creation of 
the American Republic in 1969. In 1972 Pauline Maier’s From 
Resistance to Revolution provided more detail on the evolution of 
ideas that influenced advocates for American independence, and 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 244.  
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in 1975 J.G.A. Pocock’s The Machiavellian Moment, a 
culmination of work that had begun in the early 1960s, traced the 
“radical” ideas about sovereignty and governance endorsed by 
American separatists to English antecedents. In 1972 Robert 
Shalhope concluded that a new historiographical “synthesis,” 
highlighting the importance of republican theories of government 
in the revolutionary and framing decades, had emerged.21 In that 
“synthesis” there seemed little room for Beardian interpretations. 
Wood observed that “[i]t seems obvious by now that Beard’s 
notion that men’s property holdings, particularly personalty 
holdings, determined their ideas and their behavior was so crude 
that no further time should be spent on it.” 22 
Wood’s comment suggested that to the extent that the 
“republican synthesis” literature dominated historians’ 
conceptions of the framing era, Beard’s work on the framers 
would be dismissed. But the “republican synthesis” literature 
eventually came to be seen by some scholars as monocausal or 
reductionistic,23 and in 2003 Robert McGuire produced a “new 
economic interpretation of the United States Constitution” that 
employed statistical and econometric analysis24 in the course of 
arguing that supporters of the Constitution tended to own public 
and private securities and to live close to navigable waterways.25 
So perhaps we need to take a fresh look at Beard. 
My effort here is to look again at Beard through lenses first 
supplied by Hofstadter: to see Beard as one of the first of a group 
of twentieth-century scholars who revolutionized the study of 
American legal and constitutional history, and whose influence is 
in some respects still felt. I am employing Hofstadter’s term 
“Progressive” as a label for the group, and will be describing their 
contributions across a range of issues, only a few of which Beard 
addressed in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. 
 21. Robert Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49 (1972). 
 22. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, 
626 (1969). 
 23.  Robert Shalhope’s Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. 
& MARY Q. 334 (1982), represents a partial response to that reaction. 
 24. ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION 3–13, 33–34, 38–41 
(2003). 
 25. See, Id. at 43, 53–54, 65–66, 68–69 tbls.3.5 & 3.6, 74 tbl.3.8, 75, 76 tbl.3.9, 77, 79 
tbl.3.10, 81 tbl.3.11, 91–92, 154. McGuire also argued that “delegates who were in personal 
debt, owned slaves, or represented more isolated backcountry areas generally were 
significantly less likely to have ratified than were other delegates.” Id. at 159. He concluded 
that “had different interests been represented at the state ratifying conventions, there 
likely would have been no ratification of the Constitution as drafted.” Id. at 160.  
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***** 
Elsewhere I have sketched what I consider to be the defining 
elements of a “Progressive” historiographical stance toward 
issues in legal and constitutional history.26 The stance contains five 
such elements, each of which is related to the others. Not all 
“Progressive” works of legal history exhibit all the elements, 
because the elements consist of attitudes toward distinct topics, 
such as law, judging, controlling themes in history, and the 
relationship between legal doctrine and its social context, and not 
all the works address each of those topics.27 
The defining attitudes of “Progressive” works of legal 
historiography amount to a set of starting assumptions. Those 
assumptions are not invariably treated as the equivalent of truth; 
in some works the author employs historical data in an attempted 
demonstration of the truth of an assumption. In those same works 
another assumption may inform the author’s analysis but simply 
be taken for granted. Nonetheless each of the assumptions may 
be said to implicitly or explicitly reinforce one another. 
Initially, I want simply to list the defining elements, without 
commenting on their relationship to one another or giving them 
an order of priority. The elements are: 
—A characterization of American history, including 
American legal history, as an ongoing clash between antagonistic 
“classes” and “interests,” with “class” and “interest” being 
conceived of in economic terms, although reflected in social and 
political alignments.28 
—A conception of judging as an instrumental exercise driven 
by the ideology of the judge, with a corresponding emphasis on 
the outcomes reached in cases and the short-run political, social, 
 26. G. Edward White, The Lost Origins of American Judicial Review, 78 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1145, 1146–48 (2010). 
 27. I am giving only some examples of works in legal and constitutional history 
exhibiting a “Progressive” perspective: one could list numerous others. I am assuming that 
were a work of legal or constitutional history I have labeled “Progressive” to address one 
of the topics not included in its coverage, the writer’s attitude toward that topic would be 
consistent with the defining elements of “Progressive” legal historiography. 
 28. Hostadter noted this element in Beard’s An Economic Interpretation; see 
HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 209-10, and one can see also see it, in a quite different 
context, in CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 187, 189–91, 328–34, 337–41 (1914), whose first edition appeared in 1914. 
Haines’s Ph.D. dissertation, published in 1909 as The Conflict over Judicial Powers in the 
United States to 1870, was directed by Beard.  
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and economic consequences of those outcomes, an emphasis on 
the social and economic backgrounds, and political affiliations, of 
judges, and a de-emphasis on the reasoning of judicial opinions, 
especially insofar as that reasoning assumes that the authority of 
legal sources can be neutrally discerned by judicial interpreters of 
those sources. 29 
—A skeptical attitude toward claims that “law” is an 
authoritative body of rules that can be thought of as independent 
from the attitudes or goals of those who interpret it, independent 
from or transcendent of politics, or as timeless and thus not fully 
dependent on its social context.30 
—A view of legal decisions, legal principles, and legal rules 
as “mirroring” their social context, so that changing conditions in 
society, and changing public attitudes, will inevitably be reflected 
in changes in the law.31 
—A belief that the legal rhetoric employed by judges and 
other officials to justify decisions often serves to obscure rather 
than to illuminate the true bases of those decisions, so in order to 
understand the “meaning” of decisions one needs to look 
elsewhere, such as toward the historical context of the decisions, 
their political, social, or economic consequences, or the 
personalities and ideological leanings of the officials who made 
them.32 
Next I want to suggest how the elements might be seen as 
mutually reinforcing. If one begins with a view of American 
history, and contemporary American culture, as a clash of 
opposing “classes” seeking to promote their social, political, and 
economic “interests,” it follows, first, that judges and other legal 
officials, like the rest of the American public, need to be seen as 
representatives of particular classes, and of particular interest 
groups, whose attitudes toward public issues will be affected by 
 29. See Max Lerner, John Marshall and the Campaign of History, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 
396, 406–15, 421–30 (1939); HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN 
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES 14, 16 (1948); ARNOLD PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 2 (1960). 
 30. PRITCHETT, supra note 29, at 14–20, 73–75; OSCAR AND MARY HANDLIN, 
COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 at 208–12 (1947); FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955 at 35–37, 74–79, 119–
21, 213–14, 217 (1955). 
 31. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973). 
 32. HAINES, supra note 28, at 252–63, 325–26; CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. 
FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 166–80, 198–99, 249–57, 265–67, 363, 369–84, 402–03, 
426–27, 430–31 (1930); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 360–
61, 365–66, 542–43, 548, 557, 559 (1946).  
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their affiliations. It also follows that responses to legal issues will 
be no different from responses to other issues that affect the 
public, so one should expect the “class” and “interest group” 
affiliations of judges to affect their decisions in the same manner 
that they might affect other public officials or private citizens. 
These conclusions suggest that much of the language of the 
law, which features technical discussions of legal sources that are 
often unintelligible to persons without legal training, which 
almost never allude to “classes” or “interests,” and which only 
rarely detail the short-run political, social, or economic 
consequences of a decision, needs to be ignored or discounted by 
persons seeking the meaning of legal decisions. Instead 
contemporary readers of legal decisions need to look elsewhere 
for that meaning, such as in the practical consequences of the 
decisions’ outcomes, or in the backgrounds and ideologies of the 
judges who decided them. And readers of historical decisions can 
look in an additional place, in the social, political, and economic 
contexts of decisions made in particular eras, for there will be a 
“fit” between the decisions and the political, social, and economic 
practices and attitudes of their times. 
If legal decisions are understood in this fashion, “law” comes 
to be seen less as a “mysterious science,” unintelligible to those 
without legal training, or as a transcendent and timeless body of 
principles, designed for recourse in all situations. Instead law and 
legal institutions become drawn in to the “Progressive” narrative 
of American history, so that individual Supreme Courts are 
described as personifying the views of particular classes or 
interests, changes in the law are seen as “mirroring” changes in 
society at large, and there is no meaningful separation of law from 
politics, law from economics, or law from the social configurations 
of American life. 
It followed from the Progressive narrative’s rejection of law 
as an entity with some degree of autonomy from its social context 
that Progressives also displayed skepticism toward the construct 
of a “rule of law” in American culture that transcended and 
constrained the particularistic attitudes and agendas of legal 
decision makers. Progressive narrators assumed that humans 
made laws in accordance with their ideological predilections, 
which were themselves the products of social, political, and 
economic conditions and experiences. Since humans made laws, 
they could unmake them, so, in charting the course of American 
legal and constitutional history, the central questions for 
historians were about how existing laws served to further, or stand  
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in the way of, the political or economic or social “interests” of 
lawmakers. 
The narrative of Progressive legal history was thus 
relentlessly modernist in its starting premises. Its practitioners 
presupposed that the principal causal agents in history were 
human beings holding power and exercising their will. They also 
presupposed that human “will” was a product of the social 
experiences of human actors. And since neither law nor any other 
putative causal agencies in the universe operated independently 
of human will,33 legal history was best understood as a series of 
episodes in which human actors reacted to their social experiences 
by creating laws and policies designed to further their “interests” 
as they currently understood them. The fact that legal policies 
were policies about governance, as distinguished from policies 
about the economic marketplace or social arrangements or 
political organization, did not divest them of their human-created, 
socially contingent, “interested” character. 
No single Progressive historian’s scholarship addressed all of 
the defining themes of the genre, but each launched his work from 
a set of modernist assumptions about causal agency. Beard’s 
Economic Interpretation had nothing specific to say about judges 
or judicial interpretation of the Constitution: his focus was on 
those who drafted the document, not those who subsequently 
interpreted it. But it followed from his conclusions about the way 
the Constitution came into being—as a document designed to 
promote the economic interests of a majority of its framers—that 
judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions would 
emanate from the perceived interests of the interpreters. 
The critical step in Beard’s analysis of the Constitution’s 
framing was thus one that he did not address, let alone defend. He 
assumed that it made complete sense to think of the provisions of 
the Constitution as reflecting, at bottom, the economic interests 
of one group or another of its framers. His methodology, which 
included tracking the “interests” of delegates, was predicated on 
the belief that if one described those interests accurately, 
conclusions about the motivation of the framers would follow. 
 33. Such agencies, in “premodern” epistemology, included history as a source of 
recurrent foundational principles, the figure of an omnipotent deity, and nature, all of 
which were thought to significantly confine the capacity of humans to “cause” anything. I 
discuss premodernist epistemology in more detail in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL 
COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 5–6, 786–87 (abr. ed. 1991), and the transition from 
premodernist to modernist theories of causal agency in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 5–9 (2000).  
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Although Beard spent a good deal of time tracking interests and 
distinguishing one set of economic interests (“personalty”) from 
another (“realty”), he spent almost no time supplying arguments 
in support of his conclusions. On the contrary, he assumed that 
once a delegate’s “interest” was characterized, the only remaining 
step was to demonstrate how that delegate’s interest might (or, in 
some instances, might not) benefit from replacing the Articles of 
Confederation government with the Constitution.34 
At one point Hofstadter, in seeking to explain the initial 
excitement that Beard’s Economic Interpretation generated, 
spoke of the book as having “rescued constitutional scholarship 
from the atmosphere of mythology and turned it [to] a search . . . 
for the social and economic sources of the controversy.”35 That 
comment was ambiguous. Hofstadter might have been suggesting 
that prior to Beard scholarship on the Constitution had unduly 
venerated that document, or he might have been suggesting that 
prior scholarship had been too inclined to focus on the legal text 
of the Constitution and its interpretations, without examining the 
social and economic setting in which the Constitution was drafted. 
Beard had paid some attention to the Constitution’s social and 
economic context: his characterizations of the “interests” of 
delegates were presented after he had detailed sources of 
economic conflict in late eighteenth-century America, with 
holders of public securities being pitted against those whose 
income was mainly generated from their landownings. But Beard 
had been disinclined to provide explanations for why owners of 
“personalty” and owners of “realty,” assuming that they had 
conflicting economic interests,36 concluded that those interests 
inclined them to support or oppose the Constitution. Beard 
thought it sufficient to match up interests with votes, and let the 
reader conclude that interests drove votes. 
I am thus inclined to conclude that much of the excitement 
initially generated by Beard’s Economic Interpretation, and much 
 34. At one point in his analysis of Beard’s Economic Interpretation Hofstadter 
cataloged 11 instances in which Beard asserted that those who supported the Constitution 
were “immediately, directly, and personally interested in . . . deriving economic advantages 
from the establishment of the Constitution.” HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 215–16 
(emphasis omitted). It was apparently enough for Beard to demonstrate that a delegate 
had a particular economic “interest”; the conclusion that the delegate was supporting (or 
opposing) the Constitution to derive economic advantage naturally followed. 
 35. HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at 226. 
 36. Among the criticisms of Beard leveled by Robert Brown was that Beard 
overestimated the intensity of conflict among economic interests at the time of the 
Constitution’s framing. See, e.g., ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 185, 193, 197–98 (1956).  
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of its continued influence in the historical community through at 
least the 1940s, came from the fact that both Beard and his 
audiences shared views about the course of history, the nature of 
historical change, the relationship between law and its social 
context, and the essence of legal decisionmaking that I have 
labeled modernist. Beard was one of the early American 
historians to assert that the framing of the Constitution, like other 
pivotal episodes in American history, was “really” a clash among 
competing economic interests, and that law was no different from 
other dimensions of American life in being profoundly affected 
by those interests. His audiences took that assertion as 
presumptively correct, and were impressed that Beard had 
supplied details from the framing generation. 
***** 
Seeing Beard as an early twentieth-century modernist, and 
Progressive legal historiography as being driven by modernist 
premises, can thus serve as a partial explanation for the initial 
impact of An Economic Interpretation and its continuing 
influence.37 But the modernist and Progressive dimensions of 
Beard’s history do not explain, at least facially, another feature of 
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. That feature was 
noted by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes when he first read Beard 
in 1916.38 I believe it to be the basis of the strongly negative 
reaction to Beard’s work in some sectors of the American public. 
Holmes wrote Frederick Pollock in 1916 that he found 
Beard’s claim that “the men who drew the Constitution belonged 
to the well-to-do classes and had the views of their class” 
unremarkable.39 But he added that Beard had also intimated that 
 37.  I am suggesting that the scholarly arguments and conclusions in each of the 
works cited in notes 28–32, were derived from modernist starting premises. 
 38. Holmes wrote letters reacting to An Economic Interpretation to both Frederick 
Pollock and Felix Frankfurter in that year. In the letter to Pollock, written on July 12, he 
noted that he had “taken up An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the U.S.” 
Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (July 12, 1916), in 1 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 237 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). In the letter to 
Frankfurter, written four days later, he described Beard’s book as one that Frankfurter 
had “recommended and sent.” Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Justice Felix 
Frankfurter (July 16, 1916), in HOLMES & FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE 
1912–1934, at 53 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds., 1996). 
 39. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock, supra note 
38.  
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the framers’ motives were “self-seeking,” and thus somehow 
disreputable. Holmes characterized that intimation as “a covert 
sneer.”40 He would later be more explicit to Pollock, writing that 
he found An Economic Interpretation “a rather ignoble . . . 
investigation of the investments of the leaders, with an innuendo 
even if disclaimed,” and composed of “[b]elittling arguments.” 41 
Holmes expressed the same reaction in letters to Harold 
Laski and Felix Frankfurter. He suggested to Laski that 
“notwithstanding [Beard’s] disavowal of personal innuendo,” An 
Economic Interpretation “encouraged . . . the notion that personal 
interests on the part of the prominent members of the Convention 
accounted for the attitude they took,” thus making the book “a 
stinker.”42 To Frankfurter, Holmes wrote that “[t]he disclaimed 
yet ever-present innuendo that they all were influenced by having 
some stock that would appreciate” was “rather unworthy 
trifling.”43 
Holmes thus read Beard’s work as an example of what early 
twentieth-century reformers called “muckraking”: an effort to 
expose the baser motives of public officials. That reaction raises 
two questions that relate to the themes of this essay. First, why did 
Holmes think that Beard’s ascription of economic motives to the 
framers was intended to “belittle” their support for the 
Constitution, and was in that respect “ignoble” and “unworthy”? 
Second, if Holmes was accurate in his conclusion that Beard was 
seeking to “expose” the framers’ attitudes in the fashion of a 
muckraker, was this goal of Beard’s generally shared by 
Progressive legal historians? In suggesting that political, social, or 
economic motives lay behind the decisions of legal decision 
makers, were they also suggesting that those motives were 
somehow base or sinister? 
Holmes seems to have taken Beard’s cataloguing of the 
economic interests of the framers as an effort to expose them as 
hypocrites, voting for a document that promoted their interests 
while justifying it on other grounds, or as ignoble public servants, 
substituting their private concerns for the public good. But in the 
same letter to Pollock in which he suggested that Beard's 
 40. Id. 
 41. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (June 20, 
1928), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 222–23 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). 
 42. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Nov. 13, 1928), in 2 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1109 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
 43. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to Justice Felix Frankfurter, supra 
note 38.  
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approach included a "covert sneer," he said that no evidence was 
required to conclude that the framers "belonged to the well-to-do 
classes and had the views of their class."44 It was as if Holmes took 
for granted that members of the framing generation would hold a 
“class” viewpoint on public issues, but also thought it “ignoble” 
for a historian to maintain that such a viewpoint actually drove 
their responses to those issues. 
The apparent inconsistency in Holmes’s position can be 
unraveled if one first assumes that all public officials have 
“interests,” but then associates “nobility” in those officials with 
disinterestedness. In Holmes’s terms, delegates to the 
Philadelphia convention and state ratifying conventions could be 
expected to have been members of the wealthier classes, and to 
instinctively hold the views of those classes where an issue had 
“class” overtones. But at the same time one should expect that 
public servants would support policies that they believed 
furthered the welfare of all citizens, even where the policies did 
not favor their own interests. Those positions could be said to be 
“disinterested.” And they could also be said to reflect a civic-
minded ethos of public service.45 
So when Beard totaled up the economic “interests” of the 
framers and then suggested that their support for or opposition to 
the Constitution reflected those interests, he was ignoring the 
ethos of disinterestedness for public servants. “It cannot be said,” 
Beard wrote, “that the members of the Convention were 
‘disinterested.’” 46 That was what Holmes found “unworthy” and 
“ignoble” in Beard’s approach. Beard’s “covert sneer” came, for 
Holmes, from Beard’s implicitly suggesting that the framers did 
not give a fig for the ethos of disinterestedness, and 
unapologetically voted their interests. 
Here we get an inkling of what distinguished Holmes’s 
reaction to Beard from the subsequent Progressive historians who 
 44. 1 Holmes-Pollock Letters, supra note 38. 
 45. At the time of the framing of the Constitution the ability to vote in elections was 
limited in most states to male “freeholders,” those who owned land in fee simple. 
Periodically, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, state legislatures debated 
whether to extend the franchise to persons other than freeholders. In those debates some 
members of legislatures who were freeholders supported extending the franchise. The 
disinterestedness canon suggested that even though those freeholders recognized that the 
extension would be against their “interest” in the sense of potentially diluting their voting 
power, they supported the extension out of civic-mindedness, believing that public officials 
should be elected by larger numbers of the population, or that voting should be an essential 
element of civic life in a republic. 
 46. BEARD, supra note 2, at 151.  
 
4 - BEARD & PROGRESSIVE LEGAL HISTORIOGRAPHY (DO NOT DELETE) 7/18/2014 9:40 AM 
362 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:349 
found Beard’s approach inspiring. Holmes took for granted that 
there were “classes” in American society and that members of 
those classes reflected their membership in ideological positions. 
The framing generation, with its repeated talk of the “passions” 
and “interests” that were endemic in public officials as well as 
other humans, agreed with Holmes. But Holmes also shared with 
the framing generation the idea that the appropriate ethos of 
governance was one that sought to restrain “interested” 
tendencies in public officials. The Progressives denied that any 
such ethos existed. The interests and “class views” of officials 
shaped politics. 
To their conviction that political, social, and economic 
“interests” lay beneath the decisions of public officials, including 
legal officials, the majority of twentieth-century Progressive 
historians added another ingredient, an inclination to be 
“levelers” in the “class conflicts” that defined American history. 
To the extent that the policies of governing officials favored the 
wealthy classes over the poorer ones, or the more socially 
prominent classes over the less socially prominent ones, or 
entrenched political elites over groups that sought to reform the 
status quo or gain elite status, many Progressive historians 
instinctively opposed those policies. Their efforts to demonstrate 
that particular decisions favored, at bottom, the wealthy, the 
socially prominent, and the politically entrenched were thus more 
than modernist-inspired attempts to show that human ideology 
shaped governance. They were also intended as political critiques 
of the decisions, which were frequently labeled “conservative,” 
“elitist,” or “protective of the status quo.” 
The “leveling” instincts of many Progressive historians help 
explain the continued resonance of Progressive legal 
historiography over several of the decades succeeding the first 
appearance of An Economic Interpretation. By 1912 Holmes, born 
into a prominent Boston family in 1841, had concluded that “the 
crowd now has substantially all there is.”47 One can see how 
someone of his age and background might have reached that 
conclusion. And leveling tendencies would continue for the next 
several decades. The last major restriction on suffrage, the 
 47. By that locution, a favorite phrase of Holmes’s, he meant that taxes and economic 
regulations had sufficiently redistributed wealth that “cutting off the luxuries of the few” 
would not “make an appreciable difference.” Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
to Harold Laski (May 24, 1919), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 142, 143 (Richard A. Posner 
ed., 1992). Holmes had used the identical phrase in an October 28, 1912 letter to Lewis 
Einstein, quoted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES supra, at 141.  
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exclusion of women voters, would vanish in 1919; labor unions 
had emerged in the late nineteenth century and collective 
bargaining had become a policy goal of the federal government 
by the 1930s; by the 1920s anti-trust laws and social welfare 
legislation had regulated economic activity and redistributed 
economic benefits to a degree unanticipated fifty years earlier; by 
that same decade a mandatory federal income tax had been 
established; the New Deal, Fair Deal, New Frontier, and Great 
Society programs could have been seen as progressive exercises 
in social leveling, economic redistribution, and as efforts to 
minimize the political strength of entrenched elites. 
Looking back from these experiences, Progressive historians 
could feel as if they were participating in “winner’s history.” The 
flow of events in the American past suggested that despite the 
anti-democratic motives of the framers, American society had 
become increasingly more democratic, and despite the efforts of 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century public officials to 
perpetuate the hegemony of entrenched social, political, and 
economic elites, leveling tendencies had eventually won out. Thus 
historical scholarship that exposed the inevitably “conservative” 
and elitist “interests” of officials holding power was offered 
against the background of successive leveling movements. It both 
brought the true motives of official decision makers to light and 
reminded its readers that, in the end, those officials’ goals would 
be thwarted by the inevitabilities of history. Beard’s Economic 
Interpretation was a model of that sort of scholarship. 
So the Progressive historians were not just modernists. They 
were, on the whole, enthusiasts for leveling. That tendency gave 
an edge to their cataloguing of the “interested” dimensions of 
decsion making by entrenched officials: they believed that in 
fashioning policies to support their particularistic economic 
concerns, those officials were typically supporting a 
“conservative,” elitist status quo against leveling threats. The 
Progressives’ recognition that in the end the leveling tendencies 
won out enabled them to place the officials they studied on the 
“wrong” side of history. By exposing the “real” motives of 
influential legal decision makers in American history, Progressive 
legal and constitutional historians were not seeking to fault their 
subjects for following their “interests”: at bottom, that was what 
public officials did when making policy. Instead they were seeking 
to fault their subjects for favoring the status quo when confronted 
with leveling pressures for change, and demonstrating that in the 
end their subjects had bet on the wrong side. 
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***** 
At this point we are in a position to better understand what 
Hofstadter meant in saying that Beard’s work “explained the 
American liberal mind to itself in historical terms.” By “liberal 
mind” Hofstadter meant the twentieth-century Americans who 
had supported the Progressive movement, the New Deal, and the 
successive reform movements through the Great Society. The 
twentieth-century legal and constitutional historians whom 
Hofstadter associated with liberalism believed, with Beard, that 
American history was a clash of “interests,” that the interests of 
legal officials holding power, at any point in American history, 
were generally aligned with the status quo, and thus the decisions 
of those officials tended to support that status quo. 
Those representatives of the “liberal mind” had also learned, 
however, that over time in American history leveling tendencies 
prevailed over tendencies to preserve established social, political, 
and economic arrangements. They thus not only took Beard’s 
description of the “clash of interests” at the time of the framing as 
presumptively accurate, they noted that over time the framers’ 
efforts to preserve the wealth and power of certain “classes” were 
thwarted by events. To them, Beard’s Economic Interpretation 
was thus not only accurate but prophetic. That was what 
Hofstadter meant in saying that twentieth-century liberals had 
seen Beard as “mak[ing] American history relevant to the 
political and intellectual issues of the moment.”48 That was why a 
set of Beard’s Progressive successors took it upon themselves to 
explain American legal and constitutional history in terms that 
resonated with his vision. 
Beard can thus be seen as one of the first of a line of 
twentieth-century legal historians who combined a belief that 
interest group affiliation and ideology drove legal decisionmaking 
with a growing conviction that, over time, leveling tendencies 
would inevitably overcome the efforts of entrenched interests to 
resist them. Armed with those assumptions, they set out to 
recover the “real” motivations of legal decision makers and to 
place them in a historical narrative featuring the clash of classes 
and interests. In that narrative they treated the canon of 
disinterestedness for public officials as illusory and the rhetorical 
justifications of judges and legislators as surplusage. All of those 
 48. HOFSTADTER, supra note 1, at xii.  
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tendencies marked them as modernists, twentieth-century 
liberals, and Progressives in their approach to history. 
From the perspective of modernist legal and constitutional 
historians who read Beard’s work in the context of their own 
experience with American culture and politics, from the First 
World War through the Great Society, leveling currents did seem 
to dominate that experience. Each of the established late 
nineteenth-century features of social and political stratification—
race, ethnicity, gender, inherited wealth, affiliation with elite 
educational institutions—seemed to have disintegrated under the 
pressure of leveling movements. If one viewed that history 
through modernist lenses, the contested legal and constitutional 
issues of the twentieth century appeared as a series of clashes 
between interests in which, over time, leveling interests prevailed. 
But by the late 1960s framing-era historians had come to 
recognize that although a Beardian approach to history seemed to 
have much explanatory power for the twentieth century, it 
seemed to be missing something fundamental in the framing 
period. For a time Beard’s historian critics had granted him his 
starting premises and quarreled with him over matters of 
execution. But by the late 1960s Hofstadter and the contributors 
to the “republican synthesis” had concluded, without explicitly 
stating it, that Beard’s modernist assumptions fit poorly with 
those of the framing generation because the framers were not 
modernists. Far from embracing a “progressive” vision of history 
and human agency as a causal force driving historical change, they 
feared the unlimited exercise of official power as leading to 
corruption and tyranny. Far from being advocates for broader and 
deeper public participation in governance, they equated 
democracy with licentiousness, demagoguery, and mob rule. They 
may have believed that at bottom humans were driven by their 
passions and their interests, but they also believed in an ethos of 
disinterestedness for participants in public life, not only because 
they found that ethos consistent with the aspirations of honor and 
virtue for elites, but because they thought it was necessary to 
check the baser tendencies of humans. 
Beard’s Economic Interpretation was thus, in the end, 
anachronistic in its approach to the framing period. In a similar 
fashion Beard’s Progressive successors in the fields of American 
legal and constitutional history have too readily imposed their 
modernist preconceptions about history, law, judicial 
decisionmaking, and constitutional interpretation on events from 
earlier time periods. As a result Beard’s successors produced a  
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body of scholarship whose explanatory powers lay mainly in the 
resonance of their starting assumptions to their audiences. Now 
those assumptions themselves seem the products of past eras, 
leaving a whole corpus of Progressive contributions to legal and 
constitutional history ripe for revision. An exciting prospect, but 
one, with Beard’s example in mind, worth sober reflection. 
 
